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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Larry Matthew Hoak appeals from the district court's Judgment of Conviction and 
unified sentence of life, with ten years fixed, upon a jury's finding of guilty for felony 
stalking, with a persistent violator enhancement. On appeal, Mr. Hoak asserts that his 
conviction must be reversed where the jury was permitted to hear numerous highly 
prejudicial "prior bad acts" which amounted to undue prejudice to the extent that any 
limiting instruction given was insufficient. Due to the nature and amount of the 
improperly offered evidence, taken in consideration with the limited evidence offered in 
support of the charged offense, it cannot be said that beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the admission of the evidence was harmless. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinqs 
In April of 2007, Larry Hoak was charged by lnformation with felony stalking, 
which alleged that between May of 2006 and November of 2006 Mr. Hoak: 
did knowingly and maliciously engage in a course of conduct that seriously 
alarms, annoys, or harasses the victim and is such as would cause a 
reasonable person substantial emotional distress: to-wit: by repeatedly 
writing letters to Kathryn Hendricks and sending them through third 
parties, by calling Kathryn Hendricks through a third party, andlor by 
causing her phone to ring repeatedly or continuously regardless of 
whether a conversation ensued and where the Defendant's actions 
constituting 'the offense are in violation of a no contact order in Ada 
County Case Number M0600110 andlor the Defendant has been 
previously convicted of Domestic Battery, I.C. $18-918, involving the same 
victim as the present offense within seven (7) years. . . . 
(R., pp.29-30.) The State then filed an Amended lnformation wherein it alleged that 
Mr. Hoak was a persistent violator of the law. (R., pp.151-153.) Prior to trial, the State 
filed a notice of intent to use Idaho Rule of Evidence (hereinafter, IRE) 404(b) evidence. 
(R., pp.61-62.) In its memorandum in support of IRE 404(b) notice, the State indicated 
that it was prepared to offer the following alleged evidence of Mr. Hoak's prior bad acts: 
1. The existence of a no contact order between Mr. Hoak and Ms. Hendricks 
at the time of the alleged course of conduct (R., pp.75-76); 
2. The fact and nature of Mr. Hoak's prior convictions for violations of no 
contact orders (R., pp.76-78); 
3. The fact and nature of Mr. Hoak's prior convictions for domestic battery 
and Ms. Hendricks' statements of unreported physical abuse (R., pp.78- 
79); 
4. The fact and nature of the defendant's verbal abuse and threats (including 
allegations of forced sex) (R., pp.79-81); 
5. The fact and nature of Mr. Hoak's subsequent conduct on June 26, 2007, 
prior no contact order or protection order violations with his ex-wife, and 
the fact of a prior aggravated assault conviction in 1998 (R., pp.81-82). 
Defense counsel for Mr. Hoak responded to the State's IRE 404(b) notice, 
arguing that Mr. Hoak's alleged prior bad acts were not relevant and admission into 
evidence of these prior bad acts into evidence would be unduly prejudicial. (R., pp.97- 
11 1 .) The district court found that the allegations of prior misconduct between Mr. Hoak 
and Ms. Hendricks was relevant to determine whether a reasonable person would have 
suffered emotional distress and that the probative value of the alleged prior bad acts "is 
substantially outweighed by any undue prejudice to the defendant." (Tr., p.56, L.10 - 
p.57, L.5.) The district court further found that both the prior convictions, as well as the 
nature of the events was admissible, but that it would give a limiting instruction to the 
jury. (Tr., p.64, Ls.?4-22.) Then, at the pretrial hearing, the district court changed its 
ruling, finding that evidence of a no contact order and its violation, as well as evidence 
of the nature of underlying domestic battery conviction was admissible, but the State 
could not bring up the existence of the domestic battery conviction, unless the defense 
opened the door. (Tr., p.66, L.6 - p.67, L.6, p.86, Ls.4-20, p.87, 19-21 .) 
At trial, the State relied heavily on Mr. Hoak's alleged "prior bad acts," both in its 
opening statement to the jury and during a significant portion of Ms. Hendricks' trial 
testimony. (See Tr., p.108, L.4 - p.1 I I ,  L.10 (State's opening statement), p.118, L.13 - 
p.192, L.16 (Ms. Hendricks' testimony).) At the conclusion of the trial, Mr. Hoak was 
found guilty of felony stalking, with the persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.217- 
218.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of life, with ten years fixed, upon 
Mr. Hoak. (R., pp.244-246.) Mr. Hoak filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district 
court's Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.250-252, 257-260.) Mr. Hoak then filed an 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion and addendum in support, which 
was denied by the district court. (R., pp.248-249, 280-282, 283-287.) 
Did the district court err by admitting testimony regarding prior bad acts of Mr. Hoak 
because their probative value, individually, or viewed cumulatively, was substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred Bv Admittina Testimony And Evidence Reqarding Prior Bad 
Acts Of Mr. Hoak Because Anv Probative Value Was Substantially Outweiahed BV The 
Danaer Of Unfair Preiudice 
A. Introduction 
In seeking to convict Mr. Hoak for felony stalking for sending approximately eight 
letters to third parties to be relayed to Ms. Hendricks and unsuccessfully attempting a 
number of telephone conversations with Ms. Hendricks, the State introduced numerous 
prior bad acts either committed by, or alleged to be committed by, Mr. Hoak, upon 
Ms. Hendricks. The admission of these prior bad acts, viewed individually or 
cumulatively, was unduly prejudicial and violated Mr. Hoak's right to a fair trial. 
B. The District Court Erred By Admitting Testimonv And Evidence Reaardina Prior 
Bad Acts Of Mr. Hoak Because Anv Probative Value Was Substantiallv 
Outweighed Bv The Danger Of Unfair Preiudice 
Prior to trial, the State sought to introduce into evidence, numerous acts of prior 
misconduct allegedly committed by Mr. Hoak. (R., pp.61-82.) The district court ruled 
that the alleged prior bad acts, as related to Ms. Hendricks, was relevant and its 
probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect. (Tr., p.56, L.10 - p.57, L.5.) 
However, the district court limited the evidence to be offered to the nature of the 
convictions, without reference to the fact of any actual domestic violence conviction, 
unless the defense opened the door. (Tr., p.66, L.6 - p.67, L.6, p.86, Ls.4-20, p.87, 19- 
21.) Then, during its opening statement, the State began its onslaught of Mr. Hoak's 
uncharged andlor prior misconduct. It stated: 
[l]n December of 2004 . . . Katherine will testify that she was not allowed 
to leave her house but one time in almost three weeks. During this time 
she was subsequently battered by the defendant in January of 2005. She 
suffered some bruising as a result. The defendant was then placed in jail 
and remained in jail for a while. There was some contact between himself 
and Kathy for a couple of months while he remained in jail. 
He eventually was released from jail and Kathy allowed the 
defendant - - let me put it this way - - there were some behaviors engaged 
in there and Kathy had received or gotten a no-contact order against the 
defendant. Behavior while he was in jail, there was some violation of that 
no-contact order. Okay. So consequently he is bonded or gets out of jail. 
Sometime in March of 2005 Kathy allows him to move into her 
residence. Okay. The defendant moves into her residence and the 
relationship continues to deteriorate. 
In April of 2005, Kathy's battered again suffering some bruising in 
her chest area and her ribs and her lungs. She goes to the hospital and 
she tells the treatment care provider - - well, she goes to the hospital and 
doesn't say what happened regarding how the bruises were caused. As 
she - - she continues to stay with the defendant, Mr. Hoak. 
During this time there's verbal abuse. There's threats; threats to 
cut her leg off, threats to burn her down inside her house and that 
somebody would take care of her and it would never be traced back to the 
defendant. 
Kathy will testify that again in July of 2005 the defendant batters her 
again. Again there's bruising. During a period subsequent to that the 
defendant is in jail. While he's in jail there's again a no-contact order in 
place. While he's in jail there are more phone calls, more letters. 
Somewhere near October of 2005 he's released again. This time 
Kathy didn't allow him to come back into her house. You'll hear that one 
of the reasons while there was this continued contact between herself and 
Mr. Hoak, they were working together on a business. . . . 
Between October 2005 and December 2005, Kathy begins to 
withdraw herself from the defendant. Kathy begins to put a stiff arm 
between them. And the more she does that, the more he grabbed, so to 
speak, the more he squeezes, the more he tries to hold on and things 
begin to escalate. 
On December leth, 2005, after calling nearly 14 times, Kathy finally 
goes over to his house and meets him on a street corner. The defendant 
accuses her of having an affair, of having a man in the house, and that's 
why she won't let him over to [sic] house, when in actuality she has an 
alarm for her safety, she has a cell phone for her safety to call 91 1 even if 
there's not any service. She's afraid he will see these things. She goes 
over to his house. 
She reluctantly allows him to get into her car. She begins to drive 
toward her house wondering what she is going to do. At some point he 
stops at 7-Eleven - they stop at 7-Eleven so he can go inside. Before he 
does, he gets right up in her face and screams at her, you turned me into 
the police. I will cut your head off. That's not a threat, but that's a 
promise. No matter how long it takes, I'll cut your head off. Kathy stays in 
the car. The defendant comes out of the 7-Eleven. They begin to drive 
toward her house both knowing that a no-contact order is in place and that 
can't happen, he can't be around the house. 
They go to a vacant subdivision, a subdivision that's unfinished, a 
subdivision where nobody has started building yet for the purpose of - so 
the defendant can get out of the front seat and into the back seat and lay 
down to avoid being discovered by police. She gasses it. And she leaves 
him stranded. Subsequently there are a number of other messages and 
phone calls that are threatening that you'll hear her testify scare her. 
Now, subsequently the defendant is in jail again from January of 
2005. Kathy sends one last letter, a postcard with scriptures on it to the 
defendant. That's the last contact she initiated with the defendant, 
January 2005. 
Now, with that said, you'll hear testimony that sometime between 
January 2005 and December 2005, the threat was made to cut her head 
off. In January of '06 he's in jail and in February of '06 there's letters 
written to Katherine from the jail that were never received by Katherine. 
(Tr., p.108, L.10-p.111, L.19.) 
Then, during trial, Ms. Hendricks, the State's first witness and the alleged victim, 
testified to the following conduct, occurring prior to the time period alleged in the 
charged offense: 
1. After moving into her house, Mr. Hoak isolated her from her friends and 
family and became extremely jealous if she talked to anyone. 
Ms. Hendricks testified that during this time period, Mr. Hoak "was very 
verbally abusive, would yell and scream at me for hours on end and be 
mean to me and call me all kinds of names. . . and he would keep me up 
all night and not let me sleep or sometimes eat." (Tr., p.122, L.19 - p.224, 
L.20); 
2. In December of 2004, Mr. Hoak became abusive both physically and 
mentally and on one occasion, Mr. Hoak pushed her against the wall, then 
threw her onto the bed, and later threw an apple at her head. (Tr., p.126, 
Ls.4-25); 
3. In January of 2005, when Ms. Hendricks was attempting to leave, 
Mr. Hoak pulled her out of the car, brought her back into the house, "told 
me never to do that again and pushed me over a chair and I had quite a 
few bruises because of that."' (Tr., p.127, L.25 - p.128, L.4); 
4. Mr. Hoak made threats to cut off Ms. Hendricks' legs so she would have to 
stay home. (Tr., p.133, Ls.3-7); 
5. Mr. Hoak made threats to burn her house down or blow it up with her in it. 
(Tr., p.133, Ls.18-25); 
6. Mr. Hoak violated the no contact order numerous times, after he was 
arrested and put in jail. (Tr., p.134, L.20 - p.136, L.3); 
7. Alleged requests by Mr. Hoak that she "tell them a different - - a different 
series of events that what actually transpired and that it was a mistake." 
(Tr., p.136, Ls. 15-25); 
8. After his release from jail, Mr. Hoak moved back in with her and "turned 
even more angry and abusive and was upset that . . . I got him in trouble 
with the police." (Tr., p.138, Ls.2-11); 
9. During an alleged incident, after his release, Mr. Hoak yelled at her for 
about 4 hours, then raped her, which resulted in her curling up into a fetal 
position and crying. (Tr., p.'i38, L.24 - p.139, L.24); (see also Tr., p.162, 
L.10 - p.163, L.1 (Ms. Hendricks against testifying again about the rape).); 
?O. In March, upon returning home from drinking, Mr. Hoak "started punching 
me" and "tried to strangle me." "He threw me around. Several things 
were broken at that point through the duration of the incident and he did 
not remember anything the next morning and I couldn't hardly breathe and 
he panicked and took me to the emergency room." (Tr., p.163, L.16 - 
p.164, L.13.) As a result of that incident, Ms. Hendrick testified that she 
was bruised quite a bit and three ribs were fractured. (Tr., p.164, L.20 - 
p.165, L.7.); 
' The State was also permitted to introduce into evidence, over defense counsel's 
objection, pictures of the bruising Ms. Hendricks allegedly suffered at the hands of 
Mr. Hoak. (Tr., p.128, L.19-p.129, L.19.) 
1 1  Leading up to July of 2005, 'There were further specific acts of physical 
violence, some hitting and slapping, pushing around" that resulted in 
bruising. (Tr., p.167, L.21 - p.168, L.6.); 
12. That Mr. Hoak was arrested in July of 2005, after a police officer saw 
bruising on Ms. Hendricks' person. (Tr., p.167, L.7 - p.169, L.15.); 
13. While in jail, Mr. Hoak repeatedly violated the no contact order. 
(Tr., p.169, L.18-p.172, L.17.); 
14. After his second release, Mr. Hoak threatened that if Ms. Hendricks turned 
him in again, "he was going to have to hurt me the way that I've hurt him" 
and talked about hiring a professional to deal with her. (Tr., p.775, Ls.9- 
19,); 
15. Then, in December of 2005, while violating the no contact order, 
Ms. Hendricks stated that Mr. Hoak "told me that if I ever got him in trouble 
with the police again, that he would cut my head off and that was not a 
threat, that was a promise. And he said it didn't matter if he had ended up 
going to prison however long it took, that it was going to happen." 
(Tr., p. 183, Ls.17-25.) 
It is undisputed that all of the aforementioned conduct occurred prior to the dates of the 
charged offense, between May of 2006 and November of 2006. (See R., pp.29-30.) 
I. /
Outweighed By The Preiudicial Effect 
It is part of the American legal system that an accused may only be convicted 
based upon proof that he committed the crime with which he is charged and not based 
upon poor character. State v. Wood, 126 Idaho 241, 244, 880 P.2d 771, 774 (Ct. App. 
1994). Evidence of misconduct not charged in an underlying offense may have an 
unjust influence on the jurors and may lead them to determine guilt based upon either: 
(I) a presumption that if the defendant did it before, he must have done it this time; or 
(2) an opinion that it does not really matter whether the defendant committed the 
charged crime because he deserves to be punished anyhow for other bad acts. Id. at 
244-45, 880 P.2d at 774-75. Therefore, I.R.E. 404 precludes the use of character 
evidence or other misconduct evidence to imply that the defendant must have acted 
consistently with those past acts or traits. Id. 
In order to determine whether evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts are 
admissible under Rule 404(b), a two-tier test is employed. Stafe v. Sheahan, 139 ldaho 
267, 275, 77 P.3d 956, 964 (2003). First, the district court must find that the evidence is 
material to a disputed issue in the case. Id. Second, the district court must find that the 
probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice to the defendant. Id. It is the second prong of the analysis that is at issue for 
this Court. 
Under I.R.E. 403, relevant evidence can be excluded by the district court if, infer 
alia, the probative value of that evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, danger of misleading the jury, or if the 
evidence would involve needless presentation of cumulative evidence. State v. Tapia, 
127 ldaho 249, 254, 899 P.2d 959, 964 (1995). This Court reviews the issue of whether 
the probative value of prior bad acts evidence is substantially outweighed by the 
prejudice of such evidence for an abuse of the district court's discretion. See, e.g., 
Stafe V. Cannady, 137 ldaho 67, 72,44 P.3d 1 122, 1 127 (2002). 
While the district court's calculus of whether the probative value of evidence is 
substantially outweighed by its prejudice is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, this 
discretion is not without limits. As noted by the court in Stoddard: 
This is not a discretion to depart from the principle that evidence of other 
crimes, having no substantial relevancy except to ground the inference 
that [the] accused is a bad man and hence probably committed the crime, 
must be excluded. The leeway of discretion lies rafher in the opposite 
direction, empowering the judge to exclude other-crimes evidence, even 
when it has substantial independent relevancy, if in his judgment its 
probative value for this purpose is oufweighed by the danger that it will stir 
such passion in the jury as to sweep them beyond a rational consideration 
of guilt or innocence of the crime on trial. Discretion implies not only 
leeway but responsibility. A decision clearly wrong on this question of 
balancing probative value against danger of prejudice will be corrected on 
appeal as an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Stoddard, 105 ldaho 533, 537, 670 P.2d 1318, 1322 (Ct. App. 1983) (quoting 
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW ON EVIDENCE § 190 (Cieary ed. 1972)). 
In deciding whether the danger of unfair prejudice and the like 
substantially outweighs the incremental probative value, a variety of 
matters must be considered, including the strength of the evidence as to 
the commission of the other crime, the similarities between the crimes, the 
interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the need for the 
evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to which the 
evidence probably will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility. 
State v. Winkler, 112 ldaho 917, 923, 736 P.2d 1371, 1377 (Ct. App. 1987) (citation 
omitted). 
Here, any probative value derived from the prior bad acts brought before the jury 
was substantially outweighed by the prejudice suffered by Mr. Hoak as a result of its 
introduction. Admittedly, some of Mr. Hoak's history of his relationship with 
Ms. Hendricks was probative in assisting the jury to determine whether Mr. Hoak was 
acting "maliciously and knowingly" and whether his course of conduct would cause a 
reasonable person substantial emotional distress. However, the sheer volume, nature, 
and degree of the prior bad acts is sufficient to "rouse the jury to overmastering 
hostility." The nature of the acts, allegations of both physical and mental abuse in a 
domestic partnership, is sufficiently problematic that any rationale juror could choose to 
wholly ignore the underlying charge and vote to convict solely on the prior bad acts. 
The degree of the referenced acts, allegations of rape and substantial physical injury, is 
also particularly damning such that it is not hard to fathom that a juror might be inclined 
to disregard the charged offense altogether and chose to convict based entirely on the 
alleged prior bad acts. 
Finally, the volume of conduct described by Ms. Hendricks in her testimony, 
which began on the first day of the trial, and continued into the second day, was 
massive and overwhelming when viewed in conjunction with the possible evidence the 
jury could have properly considered in finding Mr. Hoak guilty of felony stalking.' In its 
presentation of evidence, the State alleged that Mr. Hoak was guilty of the offense of 
felony stalking for mailing letters to third parties, in the hopes the letters would be 
relayed to Ms. Hendricks, and failed attempts to connect with Ms. Hendricks on the 
telephone. (R., pp.29-30; Tr., p.210, L.3 - p.243, L.2, p.243, L.22 - p.245, L.2, p.332, 
L.15 - p.334, L.21.) Specifically, the State offered evidence that Mr. Hoak sent eight 
letters, seven to Penny Stine and one to Judy Nelson, with the hope that the receiving 
parties would forward the letter on to Ms. Hendricks. (Tr., p.208, L.20 - p.243, L.2 
(Letters to Penny Stine), p.249, L.19 - p.255, L.12 (Letter to Judy Nelson).) In fact, 
Ms. Hendricks only first viewed any of the letters sent by Mr. Hoak to third parties after 
she voluntarily obtained them on her own accord from the third parties. (Tr., p.197, L.19 
- p.198, L.5, p.249, L.19 - p.251, L.22.) 
Interestingly, even the district court recognized that sheer volume of bad act evidence 
that was being presented by the State: "The problem is that, to be honest with you, 
every single statement that's being made I could be making a limiting instruction on 
because of the fact that so much of what we're talking about, bad acts, were prior to the 
dates in question." (Tr., p.156, Ls.2-16.) 
The State also offered evidence that Mr. Hoak had attempted to contact 
Ms. Hendricks through a third party on the telephone, a bondsman named Gavin. 
(Tr., p.243, L.22 - p.244, L. l l .)  After Ms. Hendricks informed the bondsman that she 
had a no-contact order with Mr. Hoak, he apologized and hung up without relaying any 
message from Mr. Hoak. (Tr., p.244, Ls.17-23.) The State then offered evidence that in 
June of 2006 Mr. Hoak called Penny Stine's cell phone, when he knew Ms. Stine was 
going to be around Ms. Hendricks, in an attempt to contact Ms. Hendricks. (Tr., p.332, 
Ls.18-22.) Mr. Hoak had been talking to Ms. Stine about his relationship with 
Ms. Hendricks and Mr. Hoak had indicated that he needed to have Ms. Hendricks tell 
him their relationship was over. (Tr., p.332, L.23 - p.333, L.8.) Ms. Stine and Mr. Hoak 
devised a plan wherein Mr. Hoak would call Ms. Stine's phone, when Ms. Hendricks 
was going to be around during a garage sale, and Ms. Hendricks could answer the 
phone if she wanted to talk to Mr. Hoak. (Tr., p.332, L.18 - p.333, L.23.) Mr. Hoak 
called Ms. Stine's phone "at least ten" times, but Ms. Hendricks refused to answer it. 
(Tr., p.334, L.2 - p.335, L.6.) Lastly, the State offered evidence that Mr. Hoak 
attempted to call Ms. Hendricks on her work line, but Ms. Hendricks never received 
those calls. (Tr., p.402, Ls.2-23.) 
Thus, while the State did offer limited evidence that the jury could properly 
consider in finding Mr. Hoak guilty of felony stalking, a large portion of evidence was 
offered regarding Mr. Hoak's prior bad acts such that any probative value relating to 
Mr. Hoak's history with Ms. Hendricks was "outweighed by the danger that it will stir 
such passion in the jury as to sweep them beyond a rational consideration of guilt or 
innocence of the crime on trial." See State V. Stoddard, f05 Idaho 533, 537, 670 P.2d 
1318, 1322 (Ct. App. 1983). Accordingly, the district court erred in permitting the State 
to introduce any evidence of Mr. Hoak's prior bad acts. Alternatively, even if it was 
proper for the State to introduce limited portions of Mr. Hoak's history with 
Ms. Hendricks, the cumulative effect of all of the introduced prior bad acts was sufficient 
to deprive Mr. Hoak a fair trial. 
2. The Given Limitinq lnstruction Was Insufficient To Remedy The Preiudicial 
Effect Of The Offered Prior Bad Acts 
Admittedly, during the jury trial and in the jury instructions, the jury was given a 
limiting instruction on how it could view some of the offered evidence not occurring 
during the time frame of the charged offense. (Tr., p.195, L.20 - p.196, L.5; Jury 
lnstruction No.20.) Specifically, the jury was instructed: 
Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the 
defendant committed wrongs or acts other than that for which the 
defendant is on trial. 
Such evidence, if believed, is not to be considered by you to prove the 
defendant's character of that the defendant has a disposition to commit 
crimes. 
Such evidence may be considered by you only for the limited purpose of 
proving the Defendant's intent and state of mind or Kathy Hendrick's state 
of mind. 
(Tr., p.195, L.20 - p.196, L.5; Jury lnstruction No.20.) While Mr. Hoak acknowledges 
that it was proper and necessary to instruct the jury on how it could consider the prior 
bad act evidence, the limiting instruction was wholly insufficient to cure the improper 
introduction of the highly prejudicial and voluminous bad act evidence presented to the 
jury. 
The United States Supreme Court has observed that: 
We normally presume that a jury will follow an instruction to disregard 
inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it, unless there is an 
"overwhelming probability" that the jury will be unable to follow the court's 
instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would 
be "devastating" to the defendant. 
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n. 8 (1987) (citations ~mi t ted) .~ 
In U.S. v. Daniels, 770 F.2d I? 11 (D.C. Cir. 1985), the Circuit Court of Appeals of 
the District of Columbia observed the inherent problems with limiting instructions and a 
jury's ability to disregard highly prejudicial prior misconduct evidence. The Daniels 
Court stated: 
We are not nearly so sanguine concerning the efficacy of jury instructions 
in curing the prejudice caused by the introduction of other crimes 
evidence. To tell a jury to ignore the defendant's prior convictions in 
determining whether he or she committed the offense being tried is to ask 
human beings to act with a measure of dispassion and exactitude well 
beyond mortal capacities. In such cases, it becomes particularly 
unrealistic to expect effective execution of the "mental gymnastic" required 
by limiting instructions . . . and "the naive assumption that prejudicial 
effects can be overcome by instructions to jury" becomes more clearly 
than ever "unmitigated fiction," As the Third Circuit has observed, once 
evidence of prior crimes reaches the jury, "it is most difficult, if not 
impossible, to assume continued integrity of the presumption of 
innocence. A drop of ink cannot be removed from a glass of milk." 
In 2001, the ldaho Court of Appeals observed that the presumption a jury follows an 
instruction to cure an evidentiary error should not be followed when "it is likely that the 
adverse effect of the improper testimony might not be eradicated by the instruction." 
State v. Martinez, 136 ldaho 521, 526, 37 P.3d 18, 23 (Ct. App. 2001). Then, in 2004, 
the ldaho Court of Appeals adopted the Greer "overwhelming probability" standard, a 
much higher standard in reviewing whether a limiting instruction cures improper 
evidence offered at trial. State v. Hill, 140 ldaho 625,631, 97 P.3d 1014, 1020 (Ct. App. 
2004). Most recently, in Sfafe v. Grantham, 2008 Opinion No. 92 (Ct. App. Oct. 30, 
2008), the ldaho Court of Appeals recognized its inconsistency in the proper standard to 
be applied, but did not solve the problem and merely held that under either standard 
Grantham was not entitled to relief. While Mr. Hoak asserts that the "adverse effect" 
standard is the proper standard to apply in the instant situation, under either standard, 
he is entitled to relief. 
Id. at 11 18 (citations omitted). Here, as the Daniels' Court properly recognized, it would 
be na'ive to believe that a jury, presented with limited and admittedly less egregious 
evidence addressing the actual alleged criminal conduct, could disregard the 
voluminous, highly prejudicial evidence of prior misconduct allegedly offered for the 
limited purpose of showing either Mr. Hoak's or Ms. Hendricks mental state. Thus, it 
cannot be said the two instructions, one given during the jury trial, and one given at the 
close of evidence would be sufficient to cure the prejudicial effect and improper use of 
the alleged prior misconduct. (See Tr., p.195, L.20 - p.196, L.5; Jury Instruction No.20.) 
Accordingly, the district court's limiting instruction could not cure the highly prejudicial 
effect the prior misconduct evidence likely had on the jury's verdict. 
3. The Introduction Of The Prior Misconduct Evidence Was Not 
Harmless 
Finally, the introduction of the prior misconduct evidence was not harmless. 
ldaho Criminal Rule 52 provides that "any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which 
does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." Using the traditional test in 
ldaho, for cases not involving "constitutional error," a guilty verdict "will not be reversed 
upon a showing of error 'if the evidence of the defendant's guilt is satisfactory . . . such 
as ordinarily produces moral certainty, or conviction in an unprejudiced mind, and the 
result would not have been different had the . . . [error not occurred]." State v. 
Stoddard, 105 ldaho 169, 667 P.2d 272 (Ct. App. 1983) (citing State v. Brill, 21 ldaho 
269, 275-276, 121 P. 79, 80-81 (1912)). Here, it cannot be said beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Mr. Hoak would have been convicted of felony stalking had the erroneous 
evidence not been presented to the jury. As is discussed in detail above, in sections 
I(B)(2) and (3), which need not be repeated, but is incorporated herein by reference 
thereto, the State offered very little evidence such that a jury could have found him 
guilty of felony stalking. In fact, Mr. Hoak's only successfui "communications" with 
Ms. Hendricks occurred when Ms. Hendricks voluntarily obtained letters Mr. Hoak sent 
to a third party. Thus, absent the vast amount of prior misconduct offered by the State, 
it cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt the jury would have found Mr. Hoak guilty 
of felony stalking based on the limited "proper" evidence presented. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Hoak respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for felony 
stalking with a persistent violator enhancement. 
DATED this 5th day of November, 2008. 
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